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Abstract—Despite a significant increase in capacity of the 
Internet regional congestion remains an issue at certain times 
of day. Dimensioning the system to provide minimal delay 
under these transient conditions would be uneconomical, 
particularly as various forms of application data are more or 
less sensitive to these delays, as are different end-users. We 
therefore investigate a scheme that allows end-users to 
selectively exploit a sequence of mini tunnels along a path from 
their origin to a chosen destination. We assume the availability 
of such tunnels is advertised centrally through a broker, with 
the cooperation of the Autonomous System (AS) domain 
operators, allowing end-users to use them if so desired. The 
closest analogy this scheme is that of a dri ver choosing to use 
one or more toll roads along a route to avoid potential 
congestion or less desirable geographic locations. It thus takes 
the form of a type of loose source routing. Furthermore, the 
approach avoids the need for inter-operator cooperation, 
although such cooperation provides a means of extending 
tunnels across AS peers. In this paper we ascertain the benefit 
in terms of delay for a given degree of tunnel presence within a 
portion of the Internet. The expectation is that a relatively 
small number of tunnels may be sufficient to provide 
worthwhile improvements in performance for some users at 
least. 
Keywords—Internet, loose source routing, tunnelling, traffic 
congestion. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Motivation for Tunnels 
Although the Internet is both robust and flexible due to 
its federated nature, providing delivery of time-critical data 
that traverses multip le Autonomous System (AS) domains is 
still challenging. This is hampered by the unwillingness of 
network operators to support inter-operator signalling 
coupled with the control of the associated forwarding 
infrastructure [1]. Mechanisms for such signalling exist with 
functional entities such as the ITU Resource and Admission 
Control Function (RACF) and the IETF Path Computation 
Element (PCE) [2]. Although these operator-owned control 
plane entities have been proposed and refined over many 
years, their adoption outside of the academic community is 
no closer. 
The signalling mechanism to support reliable end-to-end 
delivery either remains limited to exploiting AS path 
information provided by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) 
or the construction of overlay networks. Despite much 
published material on the RACF and PCE concerning how 
these entities could function across multip le inter-provider 
domains [3, 4, 5], practical schemes are no nearer adoption. 
However, the focus of this paper is not concerned with 
establishing end-to-end paths, or tunnels spanning multip le 
AS domains. Rather we aim to design a scheme where the 
tunnels available in the network will be advertised by a 
“Service Broker” to the end-users, giving the users (i.e. 
typically via some automated path selection algorithm) the 
opportunity to select which of those to use, if any, while 
sending their data from a source to destination address. We 
assume that at least some operators will be cooperative, 
letting the broker know about the available tunnels and their 
characteristics, since we consider a mechanism of financial 
recompense is in place. Furthermore we envision an entity 
being present at the users’ access point, which would select 
the most “appropriate” path for a given data stream 
depending on constraints such as the amount of money the 
user is ready to pay, the end-to-delay, and the flow content 
for example. 
The motivation for tunnelling over segments or the entire 
end-to-end path across the Internet is to overcome limitations 
inherent in the traditional next-hop forward ing mechanism. 
With next-hop forwarding the path taken by the traffic is 
determined by the router node at each “hop” point using 
information held in its Forwarding Information Base (FIB). 
The FIB data is typically constructed based on automatically 
configured routing information obtained via intra- and inter-
gateway routing protocols along with operator policy 
filtering [6]. This presents two key issues. First, the end-user 
has no say in how their data is forwarded. Second, lack of 
traffic differentiation means that information flows along 
paths based on a simple “least cost” metric leading to load 
imbalances and “best effort” equal treatment of all traffic 
irrespective of its importance to the user. 
A tunnelling mechanism, e.g., a classification and label 
switching mechanism can be used to address both of these 
issues. Tunnelling has already been implemented using 
various technologies [7]. We aim to give end-users some 
control over choosing the path their data flows by making the 
presence of these tunnels visible, advertised centrally using a 
broker, along with a means of steering traffic in sequence 
between them. Although the broker we are proposing is 
expected to know where the tunnels are, along with the 
characteristics, it does not need to know how the tunnels are 
established or operated. Operator security is not compromise 
as the details of the technology used to provide the tunnels is 
hidden, and their establishment and maintenance remains 
fully under the control of the operator. 
Users can choose to use the tunnels, if they wish, for a 
nominal fee. The idea of charging customers for better 
service is not new [8]. However, in our case electing to use 
the tunnels is optional and it is up to the user which flow(s) 
are directed through them. As such, some customers may be 
happy to pay to obtain flow transport with a better Quality of 
Experience (QoE). 
In our proposal, the end-user will be the one to decide 
whether specific tunnels will be used or not, knowing the 
“financial cost” and the expected benefits. Operators are 
expected to cooperate as they receive extra revenue by 
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Fig. 1. . User-Selectable AS-Domain Tunnelling Framework 
providing the tunnels. However, these tunnels, at least 
initially, only straddle ingress to egress points of specific AS 
domains between AS Border Routers (ASBRs). The location, 
delay, cost and perhaps resilience of these tunnels 
(comprising an IP address of the ingress ASBR and 
additional informat ion) are passed to the broker. An entity at 
the end-user’s access point can see the information 
advertised by the broker and optionally decide to direct 
traffic flows via one or more tunnels if the perceived benefits 
are sufficient relative to the cost involved. 
B. Net Neutrality 
The term “net neutrality” was first used in 2003, by Tim 
Wu, as an augmentation of the idea of “common carrier” 
(which transports data for any person or company with 
taking the responsibility of any possible loss) for telephone 
systems [9]. Net neutrality is the idea stated as “all Internet 
traffic should be treated equally” [10]. According to this 
idea, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and the governments 
regulating the Internet treat all the data equally, without 
making any discrimination or taking d ifferent charges by 
user, content, website, platform, application, type of attached 
documents, e.g., emails, audio, video, or mode of 
communication [11]. Hence, according to this policy, the 
ISPs cannot have the capability of prioritising any data over 
the others while sending it from the source to the expected 
destination. 
Thinking generally, it can be easily stated that a few 
milliseconds’ delay while sending an email will not bother 
the sender or receiver much. On  the other hand, the same 
amount of delay in a video streaming will leave negative 
impact on the Quality of Experience (QoE) of the user. 
Indeed, the argument against net neutrality is supported by 
economists, ISPs, and technologists. Even operators like 
Comcast, AT&T, Verizon, and Alcatel-Lucent, oppose net 
neutrality. 
A motivation behind our research is that from the point of 
view of an end-user, treating all the traffic in the Internet 
equally creates problems. There is  much debate concerning 
the topic of whether it is a good idea to give operators the 
chance to decide how different traffic should be treated. 
However our vision is not about charging users for the 
services, rather it gives the users the opportunity to choose if 
they want to pay for getting a better service and also provides 
some control over how their traffic moves across the 
Internet. Hence, in a way, we are not against the net 
neutrality, rather we aim to give more control to the users to 
decide how they want their traffic to be handled by the 
Internet. 
II. EXAMPLE ARCHITECTURE 
A. The Tunnelling Framework  
The basic architecture of the AS-Domain tunnelling 
framework is shown in Fig. 1. The tunnels shown are 
assumed to have been setup and maintained by the specific 
network operators using whatever means they wish. This 
could involve the use of PCE/RACF signalling; however, 
this is not essential. The presence of the tunnels is advertised 
via the Directory Service Broker (DSB). The tunnels can be 
of any technology, though it is expected that many will 
employ Mult i-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) or be based 
on optical channels. These tunnels can be both intra and inter 
AS in scope, in the latter case, this being achieved through 
operator peering. Some tunnels may offer 1+1 protection; 
others may exist between peering operators through LSP 
stitching. However, details of the construction mechanism 
are considered outside the scope of this research. 
Initially customers for this service are assumed to be 
Small and Medium Enterprises including financial 
institutions that wish to transport data quickly without having 
to incur the costs associated with a leased end-to-end 
infrastructure. They will have awareness of the sequence of 
AS domains that their data is passing through and possible 
alternatives, particularly if BGP reachability information is 
made available to them via the DSB Internet Map. 
Their IT administration, which could be automated 
software that performs path selection based on cost and other 
requirements, may wish to choose a preferred path between 
their own site and a given destination, such as between 
Customer A and B in  Fig. 1. For example, by interrogating 
the information in the DSB, Customer A wishes to use 
Tunnel T1 and T3 to hasten the delivery of data between the 
two sites. Having informed the DSB of this decision, for a 
small fee Customer A is given tickets for each of the tunnels 
(i.e. T1 and T3) along with their ingress IP addresses. Tickets 
are ephemeral so it is unlikely that users can abuse the 
system extensively. 
B. Network Operator Functions 
Tunnels traversing multiple domains are hampered by the 
unwillingness of network operators to support inter-operator 
signalling coupled with the control of the associated 
forwarding infrastructure. However, our system does not 
depend on any information that the network operators will 
not share with the Directory Service Broker (DSB) due to 
“trust” issues. We assume that cooperative operators will let 
the broker advertise their available tunnels centrally with 
some informat ion such as where the tunnels are, how much 
the usage charge is and what performance they offer to the 
users. The approach does not require any sensitive 
information such as the mechanism by which the tunnels are 
established and maintained. 
Our system deals with the tunnels existing between 
Autonomous System Border Routers (ASBRs) belonging to 
the same AS. There is no need to know about the internal 
path of the tunnels. Tunnels straddling AS domains are 
considered optional, as they would require a peering 
relationship between operators. However, mechanisms for 
stitching together LSPs across AS domains could technically 
be provided if sufficient trust existed between adjacent 
operators. However, what is required, is for the operators to 
cooperate with the broker in  order to share information 
concerning the location of the tunnel(s) in terms of entrance 
and exit points, their operating performance (such as average 
delay, whether they are protected etc.) and the financial cost 
of using them. 
C. The Broker Function 
The idea of implementing a service broker has been 
proposed in the field of telecommunication to make an offer 
of the best service against a customer’s request [12]. In [13], 
a tunnel broker system that minimizes the job of the tunnel 
server by assigning the broker server that handles the user-
requests and returns the prime configuration to both users 
and tunnel servers is discussed. 
We introduce a Directory Service Broker (DSB) in order 
to provide a centralized resource for advertising the AS 
tunnels to the end-users giving them the opportunity to 
choose to some extent their desired path across the inter-
network. We assume it will have the map view of the ASes 
that will allow the broker to show the end users, which ASes 
are adjacent to each other and, in case of the cooperative 
ASes, information concerning their tunnels will also be 
available. The broker presents the location of tunnels to the 
users superimposed on an AS view of the Internet (or a 
portion of it) and the users will have the opportunity  to 
choose whether their traffic is directed through one or more 
tunnels in a particular sequence. This provides a form of 
loose source routing. Furthermore, certain ASes may show 
information concerning their degree of congestion. This 
allows the end users to selectively choose to use a tunnel to 
detour traffic away from the congestion, or to provide 
preferential treatment across the congested AS. 
We naturally assume that the operators that are willing to 
cooperate will also pass some information saying whether 
the tunnels or their default forwarding environment are busy 
at a particular time and this information can be made 
available in the proposed broker’s map v iew. In short, the 
Directory Service Broker provides an Internet Map showing 
the tunnel locations, their usage charge and some statistics 
regarding the performance they offer. 
However, the broker does not tell the user how to get 
across the network. It provides a view of the topology, with 
the cost. Even there can be AS present in the network which 
is not cooperating with the broker. Therefore, the broker does 
not necessarily have complete knowledge of the network and 
it certainly does not know anything about what is going on in 
the ASes. However, it does provide AS network topology 
information along with a measure of how busy they are. 
Moreover, we have assumed that the route between the 
border routers (ASBRs) at the connection point between a 
pair of ASes is one-to-one. This is not always the case in the 
real Internet; rather it can be one-to-many. 
The DSB also provides a single brokerage point whereby 
the user can request a sequence of tunnel permits (t ickets) so 
that traffic can use a tandem arrangement of mult iple tunnels 
between a source and destination. The DSB is effectively the 
customer-facing entity where operators advertise their 
tunnels and the transactions that can be made. 
D. End-User Functions 
The end-user would be expected to install software in 
his/her network. The software would obtain the visualization 
part of the Internet map from the DSB. It  also needs to know 
where the tunnels are available for the users and what is their 
starting and ending points. The software will get some 
information from the user, e.g., 
• The source and destination ASes for the data of the 
user to be sent. 
• Expected service of the users, where delay and other 
constraints will be the means to measure. 
• Amount of money the user wants to pay. 
Knowing the answers of the user, the software will be 
able to: 
• Tell the least cost path using Dijkstra’s Algorithm. 
• Find the path with tunnels. 
• Compare the constraints and the financial cost. 
• Suggest the better route for the traffic. 
Initially, the decision will be made depending on two 
factors: the benefit and the (financial) cost. 
The user software will get the same visualization of the 
Internet map from the broker. Not necessarily all of the AS 
topology and ASBR topology need to be shown to the user, 
but it is up to the user whether it wants to have a knowledge 
about these. However, we are assuming that most users will 
be interested in getting an expected service provided with a 
maximum amount of financial cost it is willing to pay. In 
case the user wants to see the map, it is not impossible for 
the software to do so. Moreover, there is no concern 
regarding trust since no internal details associated with this 
information are made available. 
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Fig. 2. Example Intra-AS paths with and without Tunnels 
III. EVALUATION 
A. Implementation 
A framework is built to investigate the benefits of using 
different percentages of tunnels present in a part of the 
Internet for sending data from one AS to another. 
The topology generator tool PFP (Positive Feedback 
Preference) developed by Mondragon and Zhou in 2004 [14] 
has been used to generate regional Internet topologies which 
are then fed into the bespoke tool we have developed. The 
PFP model starts from a small random AS-graph and keeps 
growing where at each step, new nodes are attached to old 
nodes and old nodes also peer with other old nodes [14]. The 
probability of a node gaining a new link, which is a function 
of the node degree, is calculated as 0.048 [15]. The more 
links a node has, the more is its chance to obtain further 
links. The developers of PFP have exp lained the 
consequence as, “the rich not only get richer, but they get 
proportionately richer” [14, 15]. 
The AS topology developed from the PFP is fed into the 
framework developed for this research, which then produces 
another topology at the level of ASBRs (Autonomous 
Systems Border Routers), assuming there is a peering of 
border routers (formed by one from each of the connecting 
ASes) at the point where the two AS domains are connected 
to each other. We are aware that the route between the 
adjacent border routers of two connecting ASes does not 
necessarily have to be one-to-one; rather there can be one-to-
several connections. However, we currently confine 
ourselves to one-to-one ASBR peering. 
Moreover, within a single AS, the border routers are 
inter-connected into a full mesh, but the connections need 
not necessarily be direct; rather more than one internal hop 
may exist between a pair of border routers. Our system does 
not require this knowledge, nor do operators need to share 
this information. Therefore, the topology view of the broker 
is not necessarily a complete one. We can call it a “sanitized” 
or an “artificial” view of the Internet map. It just shows how 
the various ASes are inter connected at the AS level. 
Depending on this AS view, the ASBR topology is produced. 
We then use Dijkstra’s Algorithm to calculate the least 
cost routes for traffic to be sent from any source AS to any 
destination. The paths include the ASBRs that the traffic 
needs to traverse to reach the destination. This is the no-
tunnel least cost path. 
For now, the cost of the routes is considered using the 
metric of “delay” in milliseconds. A data packet typically 
needs to go through 4 to 6 hops within a given AS while 
traversing across a number of ASes to reach to the 
destination [16]. Hence, an intra-AS tunnel having the 
ingress and egress points in the same AS can reduce the 
delay that is experienced relative to the normal no-tunnel 
intra-AS links. This is particularly true if the normal 
pathways are congested and some form of priority is given to 
the tunnels, be that through the use of separate optical 
channels or queueing priority along shared links. Fig. 2 
illustrates a simple example of alternate no-tunnel and tunnel 
paths within an AS. 
In Fig. 2, the source and destination ASes are S and D 
and the traffic is assumed to traverse through another AS to 
reach the destination, which has a tunnel T with ingress point 
A and egress point B. The dotted lines represent normal 
intra-AS pathway including routers inside the AS. 
For now, along each of the links, the associated cost is 
the (mean) delay in milliseconds. The four types of delay 
contributing to the total end-to-end delay are: transmission 
delay (Tx), propagation delay, processing delay and 
queueing delay. The propagation delay between the ASBRs 
A and B will be same for the no-tunnel normal path and the 
tunnel. [17] shows that the processing delay matters although 
both of processing and transmission delay are 
proportionately small. Hence, queueing delay is the one that 
typically contributes most to the delay experienced. [17] 
confirms that processing and queueing delays are the ones 
that are usually considered in terms of measurements and 
simulations. 
The amount of delay experienced via tunnels versus no-
tunnel intra-AS paths and the corresponding cost ratio have 
been chosen carefully after doing some research on Internet 
delay measurements [17, 18, 19, 20]. Keeping the hop count 
in mind, our experiments have been run considering the 
normal intra-AS path cost as 3x milliseconds and 4x 
milliseconds, where the cost for using a tunnel is x 
milliseconds.  
Our tool uses Dijkstra’s Algorithm to calculate the no-
tunnel least cost path depending on these allocated costs. 
After that, the tool generate a given percentage of tunnels in 
the produced AS topology. Taking the expected number of 
tunnels as user input, the tool places different percentages of 
tunnels in randomly chosen ASes and calculates the least 
cost path again considering the tunnels in and the least cost 
path included the tunnels if and only if the delay cost of the 
tunnels is less than that of the no-tunnel paths. For now, we 
assume an AS which is selected for hosting tunnels, has them 
arranged in a full mesh between the ASBRs of the AS. 
B. Results 
Initially, a small graph of 7 ASes is provided as an input 
to the PFP model in order to evolve a topology of a total of 
30 ASes, where the average node degree is set as 3 and the 
probability of a node obtaining a new inter-AS link / 
adjacency is 0.04. Using PFP, five topologies have been 
developed with these same characteristics that are then used 
to test the tool developed. 
Results of one of the topologies are now considered in 
detail. Taking the PFP-generated AS-level topology as input, 
the developed framework produces a topology at the ASBR 
level. Next Dijksta’s Algorithm calculates the least cost path 
from every AS to all the remaining ASes. Then the presence 
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Fig. 4. Average and Standard Deviation of Cost Benefit 
(Ratio of Tunnel cost to No-Tunnel cost = 1:4) 
of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% and 30% tunnels are 
consequently added to the topology and least cost paths are 
again calculated for every percentage. 
For all the experiments, unless otherwise stated, the ratio 
of the cost of a tunnel in an  AS to that of a normal no-tunnel 
path is set as 1:3 (delays are considered in milliseconds). For 
now, no inter-domain tunnels have been considered and the 
cost of a link between the peering border routers of two 
adjacent ASes is set to 1 ms. 
The benefit of the tunnels present is calculated as 
follows: 
Benefit from AS “A” to AS “B” for x% tunnels = [cost from 
A to B using no tunnels minus the cost from A to B when x% 
tunnels are present] ms 
 
This is automatically calculated using Dijkstra’s 
algorithm for each least cost path and then the average and 
standard deviation of these differences is calculated. It 
should be noted that in many cases there would be no cost 
benefit of going via one or more tunnels when they are 
remote from the original no-tunnel pathway. 
This tunnel-placement process is repeated 10 times for a 
given overall AS topology and the average and standard 
deviation of the benefit are calculated. Fig. 3 presents a 
graph of the results for one topology. 
It is clear from the graph that the benefit increases, as 
there is an increase in the percentage of tunnels present in the 
Internet. The average improvement is relatively small. This 
is not surprising, as many paths would incur a costly 
diversion to reach tunnel(s), particularly when they are few 
in number. However, the increasing standard deviation 
shows that between a smaller number of source-destination 
pairs, the cost benefit can be substantial. 
1) Using Different Topologies 
The same evaluation is performed for four other 30-AS 
topologies with the same node degree and growth 
characteristics. Table 2 summarises the results for those. As 
expected, as the proportion of tunnels increase so to does the 
average benefit. When the percentage of tunnels is small, the 
average benefit is marg inal. However, from the standard 
deviation, we can see that some users, located close to the 
tunnels can still obtain a considerable benefit. 
TABLE I.  AVERAGE AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE BENEFIT OF 
USING TUNNELS (MS) 
% of 
tunnels  
Top1 
  
Top2  Top3 Top4 
 Average/ 
Std Dev  
Average/ 
Std Dev 
Average/ 
Std Dev 
Average/ 
Std Dev 
5% 0.325057/ 
0.492979 
0.10698/ 
0.425952 
0.309425/ 
0.601801 
0.053334/ 
0.28789 
10% 0.430345/ 
0.647781 
0.438125/ 
0.736941 
0.46006/ 
0.790095 
0.218391/ 
0.574282 
15% 0.822418/ 
0.893881 
0.59418/ 
0.899783 
0.657011/ 
0.953498 
0.558391/ 
0.786062 
20% 0.98318/ 
1.044247 
0.847816/ 
1.057714 
0.818391/ 
1.049085 
0.703908/ 
0.921514 
25% 1.217595/ 
1.120945 
0.945149/ 
1.138616 
0.872184/ 
1.092653 
0.777931/ 
0.977332 
30% 1.272562/ 
1.134269 
1.104503/ 
1.230331 
0.998161/ 
1.173999 
0.914943/ 
1.028713 
 
2) Using a Different Cost Ratio 
The topology that was used for generating Fig. 3 is tested 
again for a different tunnel / no-tunnel cost ratio of 1:4. As 
with the previous experiment, 10 tunnel placement runs were 
performed to obtain the average result. These values are 
presented in Fig 4. 
As expected, this graph shows a greater cost benefit. It is 
therefore worth noting that during peak hours or when 
specific high-demand events occur, the intra-AS queueing 
delay can be tens of milliseconds if not more. If tunnels 
bypass such “hot spots” the delay cost benefit could be 
orders of magnitude providing end-users considerable benefit 
in terms of delay reduction. 
3) Using a Different Average Node Degree 
Finally the PFP generator is used again to generate an 
AS-topology from the same initial 7-node seed graph that 
has been used to generate the topology used in Fig. 3 and 4. 
however, this time the graph evolution is altered by setting 
the average node degree to 4.  The tunnel / no-tunnel delay 
cost ratio was taken to be 1:4. 
The average and standard deviation of the delay cost 
benefit for the presence of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% and 
30% tunnels were calculated and are shown in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5. Average and Standard Deviation of Cost Benefit 
(Ratio of Tunnel cost to No-Tunnel cost = 1:4) 
The greater inter-AS connectivity has a marginal 
improvement of the no-tunnel paths and thus the benefit of 
the tunnels is slightly reduced. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Using the developed framework we are able to examine 
the delay benefits that intra-AS tunnels might bring to the 
Internet. It shows that there is a benefit for even 5% tunnels 
in the network for some users, though this is dependent on 
how close the tunnel alternatives are to the default traditional 
pathway. 
To show the variation in benefit between source-
destination tuplets we provide the standard deviation. 
However as one standard deviation only encompasses  about 
68% of a Normally distributed population, it is worth noting 
that for some uses the cost benefit would be appreciable. 
Indeed if the standard path experiences delays brought about 
by “hot-spot” congestion then tunnel alternatives become 
much more attractive. Even so, in this paper we have omitted 
these “extraordinary” congestion scenarios as it is self-
evident that access to low delay tunnels would be attractive.  
A further aspect of user-selectable tunnels not explored in 
detail in this paper is their ability to partially pin down a 
route to circumvent “less desirable” areas of the Internet. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper introduces a tunneling framework allowing 
cooperation between end-users and transport service 
providers via a brokerage mechanism. This is  done in such a 
way that trust issues to do with the tunnel details and AS 
domain internal architecture are not compromised. The paper 
then takes a conservative approach to the introduction of low 
delay-cost tunnels in an Internet region, typically compris ing 
about 30 AS domains. We avoid inter-tunnels spanning ASes 
as this would typically require cooperation between Service 
Providers. Instead we focus on intra-AS tunnels that are 
added in a relatively low concentration. We show that 
although the delay-cost benefits would be marginal for many 
users, those users whose source-destination path is in 
relatively close proximity to one or more tunnels can 
experience a worthwhile gain. This would be more apparent 
as the cost differential increases. We believe that end-user 
selectable access to tunnels provides a suitable degree of 
choice whilst avoiding the issues of “net neutrality” and 
would allow better management of the Internet as demands 
on its resources continue to grow. 
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